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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

AUG 9 1973

SECRET

Bill —

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, U.S. Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers

Pursuant to the USIB meeting of 2 August, I am commenting on the proposed appointment of National Intelligence Officers.

I concur in the general concept expressed in the memorandum distributed to USIB members. The NIO system would, it seems to me, not only serve to replace the Board and Office of National Estimates; it would also provide a flexible method of strengthening our inter-agency work on other substantive matters as well.

My own questions about the proposal have mainly to do with the scope of responsibilities of the NIOs, their relationships with other mechanisms of the community, and the list of geographic and functional fields proposed for the NIOs. I realize that in trying a new approach of this type, it is possible to go only so far in defining specific duties, especially since much will depend on the officers selected. Nevertheless, I believe it would be helpful to consider how the NIO system might relate to the total community structure.

I suggest, for example, that we consider more specifically at this time the potential implications of the NIO system for the present USIB committee structure. I assume that the NIOs, supported by new standing committees or by ad hoc groups, would take over some or all of the functions previously performed by substantive-oriented committees. But we will need to provide for a continuing method of dealing with source problems in world-wide terms, such as the provision of USIB guidance for programming on photography and SIGINT. In that connection, it would be useful to define more precisely the role of the NIOs in the formulation of requirements and priorities, the manner in which we would deal with requirements matters which cut across geographic and functional lines, and the mechanisms for translating substantive needs into collection guidance.

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NSA, ARMY, DIA, and USAF
review(s) completed.
State Department review

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Beyond the USIB structure there is the question of defining the role of NIOs on "consumer needs" and product review in support of NSCIC and the NSCIC Working Group. There also is the matter of the relationships to IRAC. While presumably the NIOs would not directly involve themselves in resources issues, their work on requirements and priorities could provide a significant input to IRAC's work on resources.

I am not suggesting that we attempt to work out detailed answers to all of the foregoing questions before launching the NIO system. Initial emphasis should be placed on the use of the NIO system in the preparation of interagency estimates and appreciations, moving more gradually into other functions which prove to be workable and desirable. Until we have a chance to test the system, I suggest that we not dissolve any USIB committees which could be useful in supporting the NIOs or in performing interagency functions which cannot adequately be handled through the NIO mechanism.

I have a few specific suggestions on the list of areas for which NIOs would be appointed:

1. I assume that the NIO for "Europe and NATO" would also be responsible for all European Community matters, but it may be useful to clarify this by changing the title to "Europe, NATO, and EC".

2. While the geographic list should be kept to a minimum, I believe it would be desirable to assign to the NIOs responsibilities for areas not included in the present list. The Arab World, for example, is too restrictive to encompass Middle East problems. Also in South Asia and Africa we have matters of policy concern which warrant having an NIO contact for the community on those areas. These needs could be met by changing "Arab World" to "Middle East, Africa, and South Asia".

3. With regard to the functional responsibilities, there are overlapping interests which will on occasion require attention to assure responsiveness to needs (e.g., "USSR

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and Satellites" and "Strategic Weapons and SALT", or "Europe, NATO, and EC" and "General Purpose Forces" and "MBFR"). While these matters can be dealt with through the interaction of NIOs, I believe it is a point worth emphasizing that special care should be taken to avoid rigid separation between general areas of responsibility.

4. I recommend that the title "Strategic Weapons and SALT" be changed to "Strategic Weapons and Advanced Technologies". Under this broader rubric I would envisage responsibility for strategic weapons, SALT, atomic energy affairs, electronics, the general field of ASW, and air defense. All of these fields are hardware-oriented and will require substantial technical expertise in the provision of staff support to the NIO.

25X1

Ray S. Cline

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Executive Registry
73-4543

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

9 AUG 1973

Mr. W. E. Colby
Director Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Bill:

I have read your proposal for National Intelligence Officers with great interest. I am in basic agreement with the approach. Of course, the concept needs some refinement prior to implementation but with proper attention to such matters as reporting channels, it would appear that a more responsive structuring of national intelligence would result. I have specific comment at this time on the aspects indicated below.

1. The phrase "normal command channels" may need some elaboration, or rephrasing. Within DoD, at any rate, "command channels" may have a meaning that would not fit an inter-agency concept. I believe wording could be found that would get the job done without implying conflict with the statutory arrangements of the departments represented on the USIB. I would appreciate a somewhat more specific understanding of how the pick and shovel work for the NIOs would be accomplished, as I can foresee possible problems in identifying manpower of the necessary expertise and concurrent availability.

2. An NIO of the stature and capability envisaged would certainly be able to better satisfy requirements for NIEs, NSSM responses, DCI briefings, etc. While the NIO could in a practical sense maintain "close personal contact with the NSC staff," I am not sure that other principal intelligence consumers (i.e., SECDEF, Chairman, JCS) could absorb this much contact with this many people. In the case of the Department of Defense, this contact might more appropriately be through the Director, DIA.

3. Some redundancy in NIOs would be a fairly obvious necessity to allow for leave, illness, field trips. The talents needed in a back-up man would not be likely to be available in ad hoc assignments. It

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might be better to have a more permanent arrangement for principal assistants, in this way both redundancy and training for continuity would be provided.

4. The tentative list of NIOs provided in the draft represents a good approach to accommodating geographic considerations as well as high priority subjects, and I would favor this rather than any restructuring of the USIB committees, as has been discussed earlier by the IC staff. Although the draft does not discuss the USIB, I suggest that we should leave its' committee organization as is. Of course the NIOs will allow USIB to focus more directly on high level intelligence planning as it is relieved of many of its detailed considerations of estimates. It might concern itself for example with how well the NIO structure is operating and insure its relevance and priorities with respect to real-world problems. Obviously the USIB should continue to address substantive matters of major import. In the matter of geographic orientation, we should consider a more active role for the CCPC. This group might well have a geographic orientation based on expertise as to collection capabilities for specific areas, suggestions to USIB for improvement, application of collection resources against broad tasks set up by NIOs. Although it would not have to be a full time operation, periodic rather than ad hoc meetings might be appropriate.

5. The candidates listed suggest a muted role for S&T intelligence. This may not be wise, in the light of the increasingly powerful and pervasive role played by technology in political, economic, and security decisions. We have to think about electro-optics, communications, automation, space -- i.e., technology as national asset and potential de-stabilizing factor. [redacted] 25X1

6. A geographic division of the PRC may not be the best way to order our work on Chinese matters. That country seems to be a relatively independent, powerful and unitary actor on the world scene. NE Asia

7. DoD will have some excellent nominations for a number of these assignments, although some, for example the economic area, are obviously not primary to us. In this connection, I envisage vigorous support of this concept from DIA and other members of the intelligence community to preserve our momentum in the direction of unifying and streamlining intelligence activity at the national level.

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8. The foregoing comments have been set down rather hastily considering the fundamental nature of the proposal. I will continue to study the concept and provide my further thoughts as the matter is brought into focus in staff review and discussion.

V. P. de POIX
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N 0938
9 August 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers (U)

1. The proposal to appoint National Intelligence Officers includes two features that I consider improvements of our present practice. Better coordination of the intelligence community's responses to NSSMs is certainly desirable. Utilization of the key people concerned with the production of national intelligence from all agencies is also potentially beneficial, although it seems to me that it would be extremely difficult to collect a group of a caliber and competence surpassing, or even equalling, that of the BNE and the ONE staff.

2. The proposal also appears to have its drawbacks. I foresee a new set of tasking, drafting, coordination and mechanical problems for which no decision-making authority below the DCI is established, unless the Chief NIO has more authority than is indicated in the proposal. I see problems in having ten or so additional people reporting directly to the DCI, or maintaining close personal contact with the NSC staff. In short the proposal seems to create new organizational problems. Some of these problems could be mitigated by sharper definition of the authority, responsibilities and procedures of the NIOs. That definition would, I think, need to include the assignment of considerable control to the Chief NIO. It appears to me that a Chief NIO, given the needed executive authority, would function very much as a chairman of a board of national estimates in fact, if not in title. An apparent change from the present setup would be that the chief officer, presiding over NIOs whose areas of responsibility are more limited than the present BNE members', would lack some of the flexibility that the BNE chairman now has.

3. The tentative list of areas of responsibility fails to include Africa outside the Arab world, and South Asia.

25X1

[redacted]

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Serial: N 0938

4. It is not clear from the proposal how these NIOs would relate to USIB committees, or whether some USIB committees would be disestablished. We need to know how this ties in with the ideas we have heard on reorganizing the USIB committee structure.

5. In sum, while I see some merit in the proposal, I would need a fuller definition of the problems it attempts to solve, and of the responsibilities, the organizational structure, and the interrelationship of NIOs with other intelligence bodies before reaching a conclusion as to whether the proposal has advantages that could not be more readily realized by tasking the existing USIB organizations.

Louis W Tordella

LOUIS W. TORDELLA
Acting Director

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9 August 1973

Mr. William E. Colby
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The following comments on your plan for National Intelligence Officers which you circulated at the USIB meeting of 2 August, are based more on my 3 1/2 years experience as a member of the Board of National Estimates than on my brief tenure as alternate Treasury Representative to USIB.

I think the NIOs can strengthen the Agency and the intelligence community support to policymakers. It has been clear to me that the NIEs were not closely enough tied in to the NSSM process and that the intelligence contribution to the NSSMs was either duplicative or sometimes at variance with NIEs on the same general subject. I would expect that the NIOs would remedy this by taking the lead in providing the intelligence input of the community for all NSSMs. In my view the NIO should concentrate on providing an objective intelligence assessment, including comments on the reaction to various US policy options but should avoid taking a position on pure policy issues, in order not to involve the intelligence community in policy disputes.

It seems to me important to maintain the high standards of analysis, clarity and brevity which the NIEs have attained and hopefully to improve the standards of the NSSMs in this regard. This will be very difficult to do unless some of the high quality staff personnel in the Office of National Estimates are retained to do the drafting of the final product. Much of the basic research and initial work can be done by various offices within CIA and by contributions from USIB member agencies, but a committee or a busy NIO cannot pull it together and produce a tight, well-reasoned product. I, therefore, hope you will retain a good nucleus of the present ONE staff, both as assistants to the NIOs and in the small editorial staff you propose.

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Your plan does not indicate very clearly how the community products will be coordinated, though I understand there was some discussion of this at the 2 August USIB meeting. Although it was sometimes time-consuming, the thorough coordination of the NIEs has made them a truly national product and I would hope that this attribute will not be lost. On other products this may be less important, and a quicker process of coordination could be worked out. In this way the intelligence community can be more responsive to the often rushed needs of the policymakers. In all cases, however, I assume the NIO will reflect the differing views of the various community members when they are not reconcilable.

These are the major comments and questions which came to mind in reading your brief outline of the functions of the NIO. I would hope we could have a further discussion of the plan at an early USIB meeting.

Foster

J. FOSTER COLLINS
Acting Treasury Representative
to USIB

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAMI-ZC

9 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. ACSI DA memorandum to the DCI, subject: Improving the USIB Structure and Procedures, dated 2 April 1973.

b. Director, DIA, 1st Indorsement to ACSI memorandum, subject: Improving the USIB Structure and Procedures, dated 11 May 1973.

c. Draft DCI memorandum for USIB Members, National Intelligence Officers, distributed at the 2 August 1973 USIB meeting.

2. (C) ACSI DA has reviewed the draft memorandum which would establish National Intelligence Officers. Our earlier views on improving the USIB structure and procedures are indirectly related to the establishment of National Intelligence Officers. They were provided to the then DCI in April (reference 1a). The Director, DIA, commented on our views in his indorsement of 11 May (reference 1b).

3. (C) We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the DCI's draft. We found his new approach to be in accord with the President's 5 November 1971 reorganization memorandum and to be an improvement over the present system for producing substantive intelligence at the national level. A closer working relationship between the producer and the ultimate customer should improve the product. We are concerned, however, with three areas, as follows:

a. It is not clear who will assist the National Intelligence Officers in drafting the products and evaluating them. Mention is made of "panels of experts". We are unclear whether these will be formed from the same people who assisted in drafting the NIEs in the past and whether the USIB Committee structure will continue to be used to support these panels. For example, when scientific and technical data was

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DAMI-ZC
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers

needed for an estimate the drafters could turn to one of the scientific and technical committees of USIB for an agreed input. The draft paper does not indicate what happens to the USIB Committees which have proven their worth over almost two decades. While some streamlining of the USIB Committees appears in order, their relationship, if any, with the National Intelligence Officers should be described. We in Army derive great benefit by participating in the deliberations of these USIB Committees, particularly in using their products in the formulation of plans, doctrine, force structure, weapon systems and in research and development activities.

b. The draft paper describes a product to be known as "national intelligence". To the best of our knowledge this term has not yet been defined. This could lead to problems as the National Intelligence Officers are appointed. For example, would the intelligence in the General Purpose Forces category which presumably includes such items as the Rear Services of Soviet Forces fall exclusively in the "national intelligence" category? If national is used then what term will be used to describe that intelligence needed, for example, by the Military Departments and the operating forces? Thus we suggest that the use of the term "national intelligence" be reviewed.

NSCID

ILLEGIB

c. While recognizing the need to appoint only the highest qualified individuals as National Intelligence Officers, we suggest consideration be given to limiting their tenure to three or four years. Adoption of this suggestion would provide a great incentive to those younger, promising people in military intelligence.

OLIVER B. PATTON
Brigadier General, GS
Acting ACofS for Intelligence

Copy furnished:
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20330

REPLY TO ATTN OF: IN

9 AUG 1973

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Officers (U)

TO: Mr. William E. Colby
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

1. (C) I think that your proposal for the appointment of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) is a good approach to revising the national estimate system. Highly qualified and aggressive individuals in such positions should certainly provide better management and more responsive intelligence reaction to national requirements. I have in mind a number of people who would be excellent NIOs and I will provide their resumes by separate memorandum.

2. (C) I believe the proposed NIO structure should be constrained to a geographic breakout. Functional subjects, many of which cut across geographic boundaries, should be retained and modified as necessary through the existing USIB committee structure. Provision for establishment of "special" NIOs, such as Disarmament should be made. USIB would act upon these "special" NIO requirements appointing them for a specified time. Further review is suggested of the proposed geographical NIO areas since certain major geographic entities are not included.

3. (C) I recommend that consideration be given to supporting each of the NIOs with a USIB committee for each NIO area of responsibility. This would provide a tasking and production base for the NIO, as well as a channel of direct communication to the Principals.

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4. (C) The proposal that USIB member agencies provide assistants and secretarial aid to the NIO on an ad hoc basis should be reviewed for an alternative arrangement. The NIO should have a permanent staff which is directly responsive to his needs and is attuned to his attitudes and thoughts. The ad hoc assignment of transient help would not accomplish that purpose.

5. (C) I would be very interested in reviewing, when available, a detailed plan for operation of the NIO system. Of particular interest is the NIO-Member Agency relationship and the tasking lines for production.

LINCOLN D. FAURER, Brig Gen, USAF
Acting Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

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VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 15 August 1973

TO: Mr. Colby

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

1. From our recent conversations, I gather you are weighing inputs from USIB members and from your colleagues within the Agency in the process of making your decisions on the NIO question. Appended are some thoughts and suggestions on what NIOs should be established at this time, people whom you might want to consider for selection to these positions, and the kind of support structure this concept will need in order to function the way I think you want it to function.

2. As you will note, the attached was written before I learned that Ramsey Forbush is to head the new Office of Political Research.

[redacted]

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

CURRENT INFORMATION

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[redacted]

25X1

15 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: The NIOs -- Further Reflections

1. The Mix. Given the current state of the world and the President's resultant major concerns and (at another level) your desire to have one or two NIOs established whom you could reasonably anticipate disestablishing in the not too distant future in order to make the point that this is a flexible panel which can and will be adjusted as circumstances warrant, it seems to me that you should start with a group of ten -- seven with geographic and three with functional responsibilities:

a. Geographic

(1) The USSR and Eastern Europe

(2) Western Europe, encompassing EEC matters/relationships and the political manifestations of NATO.

(3) China

(4) North Asia, including Japan. I would separate this from the China account because over the next three to five years Japan's regional role and worldwide impact -- particularly in the economic, monetary and energy spheres -- and our interacting relations with Japan (deliberate or inadvertant) are going to be matters of sufficient complexity and importance that they should not be melded with the also complex and important, but different, China account.

[redacted]

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(5) Southeast Asia. This will need a separate NIO, at least for a year or so. If the area quiets down (even if the Indochina penninsula comes under North Vietnamese hegemony) and ceases to be a matter of pressing concern to the U.S., you may be able to drop Southeast Asia from the NIO panel after 18 to 24 months. (This is a conditional hypothesis, not an estimate.)

(6) The Middle East, here envisaged as encompassing the Arab World (including the North African littoral), Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan (if the Great Game recommences) and India.

(7) Latin America. This is included as a legitimate discardable. At the moment -- with unrest in Chile, uncertainty in Argentina and volatility endemic elsewhere -- a defensible case can be made for having a Latin American NIO for the time being. With luck, however, this is one you should be able to disestablish in a year or so. If necessary, you could then resurrect it later to make the point that the mix of the panel is never immutable and will be periodically adjusted in light of actual need.

b. Functional

(8) Strategic Arms and SALT-related matters.

(9) Conventional (non-nuclear) forces. This would encompass questions relating to general purpose forces (i.e., armies), MBFR matters and naval forces, especially the Soviet Navy. I know that in some circles it is fashionable to think of the burgeoning Soviet Navy primarily in "strategic" terms -- i.e., a collection of mobile platforms capable of

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[redacted] 25X1

launching nuclear weaponry. Maybe I read too much Mahan at too impressionable an age. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the classical concepts and considerations of sea power (i.e., quite apart from nuclear weapons considerations), though they may be out of fashion, are far from outmoded and should not be ignored. Approximately three quarters of the earth's surface is covered by oceans, under which lie untold petroleum, mineral and other resources which technology now stands on the threshold of making it feasible to tap. Hence, over the next decade and beyond, a nation's capacity to operate -- or protect her operations -- in distant seas may make even the traditional (pre-nuclear, pre-missile, pre-airplane) impact of sea power pale by comparison.

(10) Economics, encompassing (among other things) monetary and energy questions. Over the next three to five years, this area will probably include the U.S. Government's most urgent and vital policy problems, hence, its greatest immediate intelligence needs.

2. The People. Whether the NIO concept works or founders will hinge in large measure on the caliber, ability and temperament of the people you select to serve as the first NIOs. A number of considerations have to be weighed, including political ones, in several senses of that term. As we have discussed, salting the panel with a DDO Division Chief or two could go far to enhancing the receptivity to this concept within the Agency (particularly the DDO). You have asked other USIB members to submit nominations and noses will be out of joint if you reject all external suggestions. You have able and distinguished officers now affiliated with the Board of National Estimates -- e.g., Ramsey Forbush, [redacted] 25X1 (to name but three) whose talents it would be foolish not to exploit within the restructured Agency in some suitable capacity. On the

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[redacted] 25X1

other hand you want a synergistic whole that is greater than the sum of its parts and should avoid being mouse-trapped into setting any precedent of slots (either given ones or a given number) "belonging" to Agency or USIB components. Also, if the NIO panel is to be meaningful, it cannot be allowed to be used as a vehicle for solving "disposal" problems.

3. In his 27 July 1973 letter to you, [redacted] makes 25X1
a recommendation I regard as a dangerous blind alley. [redacted] 25X1
contends you should pick managers ("aggressive, management-oriented individuals") not "high-level analysts" or "area experts." That effective NIOs will have to be skillful managers (and diplomats) is a patently obvious truism; but unless you pick people who themselves are also substantively solid in their respective spheres of responsibility, you will be well down the slippery slope toward the "bureaucratic layering" problem which some of the NIO concept's more strident critics have insisted would be the inevitable consequence of its implementation.

4. After weighing all of the above considerations, plus some others, the following list of possible NIO candidates is offered for your consideration:

a. USSR and Eastern Europe.

(1) The optimum choice for this job

[redacted] 25X1

(2) If [redacted] is ruled out, the next logical 25X1
candidate would be [redacted] 25X1

(3) A dark horse you might want to
consider before making a final selection is

25X1 [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1

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25X1 [redacted]

b. Western Europe (including EEC, NATO, etc.). No internal (i.e., Agency) candidate springs immediately to mind, though you might want to give some thought 25X1 to [redacted] is perhaps someone 25X1 else that might be considered. In many ways, however, this is a post you might want to fill from outside the Agency, e.g., from State. If you go this route, one person you might want to look at is [redacted] 25X1 who [redacted] 25X1

c. China. In this you want a Sinologue who is not an ideologue (and that almost clears the board).

25X1 (1) [redacted] in many respects, is a very attractive candidate. Though management is not his strong suit, he has other talents and abilities which, on balance, might make him your best bet.

25X1 (2) [redacted] is another obvious Agency possibility, as is [redacted] 25X1 I would personally give a slight edge to [redacted] 25X1 over either of these two, but that may simply be because I have worked more closely with [redacted] the 25X1 past several years and, hence, currently know him somewhat better.

d. Japan.

(1) The real internal (Agency) candidate

25X1 [redacted]

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[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

(2) In the interim (of a year or so) [redacted] 25X1
25X1 [redacted] is an obvious candidate who could probably do the job very well.

(3) If you want to reach outside (and high) to get someone who would be prickly but would make life interesting all around, think about [redacted] 25X1

X

25X1 [redacted]

e. Southeast Asia.

(1) For several reasons [redacted] 25X1 is an obvious candidate for this billet.

(2) Despite the above, I would strongly and unhesitatingly recommend [redacted] 25X1
25X1 [redacted] could do the job superlatively well because I have watched him, in effect, do it. Also, his behavior and style would serve as a useful model for the other new NIOs to emulate.

f. The Middle East (as defined above).

(1) If all other things were equal, this would be an optimum slot to fill with a present or former DDO Division Chief. [redacted] 25X1 obviously comes immediately to mind. The names of [redacted] 25X1 also naturally suggest themselves.

25X1 (2) [redacted] presence and background makes other things not equal. As [redacted] 25X1 de facto deputy -- and, often, alter ego -- he

[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

25X1

(3) Another candidate who should be considered before any final selection is made is [redacted] of OCI.

g. Latin America.

25X1 (1) This "expendable" slot is also a "natural" billet for another senior DDO officer well versed in Latin American affairs, e.g., [redacted]

(2) It is also a position you might want to consider giving to [redacted] 25X1 whose abilities need no rehersal for you and whose area of greatest personal expertise is in fact Latin America.

h. Strategic Arms and SALT-Related Matters. This one is tricky. For balance, objectivity and other related considerations, I think it ought to be an Agency officer. [redacted] 25X1 is one obvious candidate (he was [redacted] 25X1 for such matters and I think he still holds that title). [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] 25X1 is another. Whoever is picked, it will be essential that he interface synergistically, not counter-productively (how's that for modern jargon) with

[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

Carl Duckett's activities. You will have to lay out, clarify and adjudicate the ground rules of his activities vis-a-vis Carl's -- and vice versa.

i. Conventional Forces. This position is a natural for a senior DIA officer or other DOD official, probably (but not necessarily) military. If military, you want a bright Major General clearly on the way up. If possible, you should get his next assignment quietly greased in advance with the Secretary of Defense, e.g., the Deputy's slot in DIA or a juicy line billet such as (at a minimum) command of a division. Anyone more junior than a Major General would (a) be hobbled before he started, (b) sacrifice his military career, or (c) both. [redacted] is one obvious candidate but there are doubtless others. 25X1

j. Economic Matters. In many respects, this will be the toughest slot of all for which to find the right person.

(1) I know the model for exactly the sort of

[redacted] 25X1

(2) If you stay inside the Agency, Jim [redacted] is certainly one possibility and [redacted] is another. Apart from these, OER is the obvious place to look. I have the highest regard for the OER people with whom I have worked but have known a rather specialized group in a rather specialized

25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

context. Of those I know -- apart from [redacted] has the necessary brains, flexibility and potential but so far as I am aware he does not now have the background. Others who know OER better, across the board, may have additional worthwhile suggestions. 25X1

(3) If you go outside the Agency but stay within the government, Treasury, OMB or the staff of the Council of Economic Advisors might be your happiest hunting grounds. I doubt if you could find what you want in State.

(4) Outside the government, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

(5) Before making a final selection, I suggest you, or someone, talk to [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

5. Essential Support. If the NIOs are to do the jobs you want them to do, they are going to need at least three kinds of essential support:

a. Each one will need his own secretary, whom he should choose, and one assistant, in whose choice he should have a major say. The latter should be young, bright, knowledgeable and energetic -- probably in the GS-12/14 range.

[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

He/she could come from anywhere in the Agency, or community, and should probably come on a two-year rotational detail.

b. Collectively the NIOs will need the support of what for lack of a better label may be termed a Secretariat. This would handle the receipt and routing of traffic (a major problem I will not even raise here), the keeping of book on pending, extant and completed projects or requests, oversight of files and records, production details, etc., etc. One person who could manage this activity with great skill would be [redacted] 25X1

c. The NIOs -- individually and collectively -- will need adequate space in which to work. Each one will have to have his own office plus appropriate space for his/her assistant and secretary. The Secretariat will have to be housed somewhere. The system will function far better if all the NIOs work in reasonable physical proximity to each other, sharing conference rooms, etc., and close to the supporting Secretariat. The risk of inefficiency, confusion (or chaos) will be materially enhanced if they are scattered all over the building.

6. Officers and/or an "Office." In past discussions of this concept, many words have been uttered and written -- some with passion -- on the pros and cons of having a panel of separate and essentially autonomous officers (NIOs) versus grouping the NIOs under the umbrella of an office. In your note to USIB you indicate that your present thinking runs along the following lines:

> "One National Intelligence Officer will be assigned administrative authority for the National Intelligence Officers. He will chair meetings of National Intelligence Officers for discussion of production standards, work schedules, quality control and product review. He will be assisted

SECR[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

by an Editorial Staff to provide central editorial standards, schedules and assistance for the National Intelligence Officers."

7. The above is a trifle delphic, perhaps not by accident. It could be read as an intention to assign this oversight function to one of the substantive NIOs as an additional duty, making him a sort of first among equals. If that is indeed your intent, seven plus years experience in a somewhat analogous endeavor has convinced me that this approach will not work. Being a substantive NIO and properly discharging what I think you envisage an NIO's responsibilities as encompassing will be a full-time job (and then some). If you have ten substantive NIOs, each with two aides, plus a Secretariat of some sort (even small) you are talking about a group of 35-40 people. Several of the individual NIO's areas of responsibility will inevitably overlap -- some occasionally (China and the USSR, Japan and China), some constantly (USSR, Strategic Arms, Conventional Forces). Refereeing disputes, being sure nothing falls between cracks, ensuring some uniformity of quality (not to mention format) in output, and generally making the NIO concept work, across the board, will of itself also be a full-time job, and then some. I do not think anyone can be both a substantive NIO and simultaneously the overseer of his panel peers. At least one of his two spheres of responsibility would not get proper attention, probably neither would be well discharged.

8. The choice, really, is not one office or no office. It is:

a. One office, each of whose members functions for you and is constantly available to work directly with you; but for which oversight responsibility (on your behalf) is clearly assigned, or

b. Ten largely independent offices, each reporting to you, each likely to be working at some degree of cross purposes with one or more of its collegial confederates, and consequently placing a great burden on your (and/or General Walters') time and attention.

[redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] 25X1

9. There is no need for any elaborate "front office" structure in the NIO panel, but I do think there is a need for one person to be the panel's manager (full time) -- unless you want to take on that chore personally or assign it to General Walters. The manager's alter ego or "deputy" certainly can (and should) be one of the substantive NIOs, but I do not see how the manager himself can be if the system is going to work.

[redacted] 25X1

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

SECRET/SENSITIVE

[redacted] 25X1

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EA/DCI		
2	Mr. Colby		
3	Exec Sec/USIB		

Remarks:

The responses from State, DIA, NSA, Treasury, Army and Air Force to your draft paper on NIOs are attached. We have not yet had definite word from General Giller regarding AEC comments. The FBI and the Navy chose not to comment. The Acting CIA Member did not provide additional comments as he felt that you were fully informed of the Agency's position.

At least a few days prior to next week's meeting you may wish to consider having me:

a. Circulate copies of all of these comments to each of the Board Principals, or;

b. Circulate a new draft of the NIO paper which take the comments into consideration, or;

c. Circulate both the comments and a revised draft of the NIO paper.

25X1

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